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Engaging the Diaspora: Prospects and Pitfalls 
 
Janna Cisterino
 Current international migration flows are quite 
remarkable.  In 2011, the World Bank estimated 
that more than 215 million people, or 
approximately 3% of the world’s population, lived 
outside their countries of birth.1  There are three 
general types of sending states or countries that 
produce a significant number of emigrants: labor-
exporting states, states that have gained 
independent statehood after a major outflow of 
their nationals, and states in conflict.2  One of the 
major contributors to emigration trends in the 
current era is the expansion of capitalism.  The real 
and growing demand for immigrant labor in 
industrialized countries has encouraged migration 
on a greater scale than in the past.3  Of course, other 
dynamics also play a role in current migration 
trends.  There have long been linkages between 
emigrants and their home countries, but the scale, 
structure, and strength of these relationships has 
changed in recent years in significant ways.  This 
paper will examine the logic behind sending states’ 
engagement with their diasporas, the mechanisms 
that they employ in achieving this goal, as well as 
some of the potential drawbacks of engagement. 
 Globalization and new, improved 
technologies, such as in communication and travel, 
have altered the dynamics of transnationalism and 
emigrants’ relationships with their sending states, 
making linkages between the diaspora and the 
homeland denser and more rapid.4  It is now far 
easier and cheaper for emigrants to call home, to 
visit their home countries, and to consume media 
produced in their home countries.  These 
developments have strengthened the identification 
of emigrants with their sending states and cemented 
                                                             
1 The World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 
   2011 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2011), ix. 
2 Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, “International Migration and  
   Sending Countries: Key Issues and Themes,” in  
   International Migration and Sending Countries, ed.    
   Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen (New York: Palgrave   
   Macmillan, 2003), 6. 
3 Alejandro Portes, Luis E. Guarnizo, and Patricia  
   Landolt, “The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and  
   Promise of an Emergent Research Field,” Ethnic and  
   Racial Studies 22 no. 2 (1999): 228. 
4 Jose Itzigsohn, “Immgration and the Boundaries of   
  Citizenship: The Institutions of Immigrants’ Political  
  Transnationalism,” International Migration Review 34  
  no. 4 (2000):  1130. 
their conception of themselves as a part of the 
political communities of their home countries.  
These transnational communities have challenged 
the traditional conception of national communities 
as defined by a common connection to some 
territory.  As Kim Barry says, “Migration 
decouples citizenship and residence.”5  Similarly, 
as Adamson argues, there is an “uneasy fit between 
the state as an administrative unit and the state as a 
spatially discrete homogenous political identity.”6  
Emigration disrupts the simplistic conception of the 
state and its nationals as a neat package bounded by 
the state’s borders.  Indeed, when emigration from 
a state is common, it can become a defining feature 
of the national experience.  In the context of this 
paper, a diaspora will be defined as a social group 
of emigrants who have sustained a collective 
identity, maintained ties with a real or imagined 
homeland, and displayed an ability to address the 
needs of its members through organization and 
transnational links.7 
 Even in the context of transnational processes, 
politics often remains about local issues.  In many 
cases, transnational politics is highly territorial in 
focus and goals, although its actors have been 
deterritorialized.8  In the past, emigrants’ economic 
success and social status depended on their 
successful acculturation and integration into 
mainstream circles of society in their host country.  
However, these things now often rely upon 
emigrants’ strong transnational links.9                        
 
                                                             
5 Kim Barry, “Home and Away: The Construction of  
  Citizenship in an Emigration Context,” New York  
  University Law Review 81 no. 11 (2006): 3. 
6 Fiona Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou,  
  “Remapping the Boundaries of ‘State’ and ‘ 
  Identity’: Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing,”  
  European Journal of International Relations 13 (2007):  
  490.  
7 Ibid., 497. 
8 Terrence Lyons and Peter Mandaville, “Global  
   Migration and Transnational Politics: A Conceptual  
   Framework,” George Mason University Project on  
   Global Migration and Transnational Politics, Working  
   Paper no. 1 (2008): 6. 
9 Portes and Guarnizo, “Emergent Research Field,” 229. 
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The Diaspora and Economic Development 
 
One of the reasons that sending states engage 
their diasporas is to obtain resources for economic 
development.  However, there is serious 
disagreement about whether emigration is 
beneficial for a state’s development.  The negative 
perspective posits that emigration and the sending 
state’s resultant reliance on workers’ remittances 
results in dependency, instability, developmental 
distortion, and a resulting economic decline that is 
not worth the temporary economic gains.10  
Remittances are viewed as a potentially instable, 
unpredictable source of revenue for the state.  A 
reliance on emigrants and their contributions to the 
state for developmental purposes sends the state 
down a dangerous path to political instability and 
unpredictable social change without the necessary 
institutional adjustments.  The influx of money 
ultimately changes the state in ways that it is 
unprepared to constructively cope with.  The 
positive perspective views emigration and the 
financial inflows that stem from it as forces for 
political peace and positive social changes in 
families and gender roles.11  Although contributions 
from emigrants are certainly not a quick-fix, they 
do provide an important source of revenue to 




Remittances from emigrants are now the 
primary source of financial inflow for many 
sending countries.12  Official estimates claim that 
the sum of remittances is greater than overall 
development aid worldwide.  Unofficial estimates 
go even further, asserting that remittance flows may 
be twice as large as development aid.13  The large 
growth in remittances has sharply increased 
developing states’ economic dependence on them 
in the past few decades.  One of the reasons for the 
trend in the growth in remittances is the impact of 
neoliberal economic policies enacted by many new 
democracies in the developing world.  These 
policies have contributed to the start or 
                                                             
10 Charles B. Keely and Bao Nga Tran, “Remittances  
    from Labor Migration: Evaluations, Performance, and  
    Implications,” International Migration Review 23 no.   
    3 (Autumn 1989): 501. 
11 Ibid., 500. 
12 Barry, “Home and Away,” 7. 
13 Ostergaard-Nielsen, “International Migration and  
    Sending Countries,” 15. 
continuation of labor migration and thus the rising 
importance of remittances as they grow relative to 
other types of financial inflows.14  Further, 
remittances have become the top source of foreign 
currency for many labor-exporting countries.  
Finally, trends in other forms of financial inflows to 
developing countries have made remittances even 
more significant.  For example, capital market 
flows and foreign direct investment (FDI) have 
fallen in the past few years, but remittance inflows 
continue to grow.15 
 The economic effects of remittances are wide-
ranging.  In their most obvious function the 
remittances that family members in the sending 
state receive allow them to better meet their 
immediate consumption needs and improve their 
quality of life.  The importance of this function of 
remittances is often belittled.  Admittedly, 
improving the standard of life of individuals in the 
sending country through outside contributions is 
less desirable than doing so by generating internal 
economic growth, but it is still significant.  The 
majority of remittances that are not spent on 
immediate consumptions needs such as food and 
clothing are spent on health care and education.16  
A healthier and better-educated work force is better 
able to contribute to economic growth.   
Remittances are also important on a broader 
macro-economic scale.  First, remittances have 
multiplier effects on the economy of the sending 
state.17  This means that a given inflow of 
remittances will generate a greater increase in the 
receiving country’s gross output than the amount of 
remittances.  By spending remittances, families 
contribute to the growth of their countries’ 
economies by providing income for others and 
creating jobs.  When the remittances that families 
receive are greater than their current spending 
needs, they raise the national savings and provide 
funds for loans and investment, thus generating 
further economic growth.  Further, as mentioned 
earlier, remittances are an important source of 
foreign exchange for sending countries.  This 
                                                             
14 Jose Itzigsohn and Daniela Villacres, “Migrant  
    Political Transnationalism and the Practice of  
    Democracy: Dominican External Voting Rights and  
    Salvadorean HTAs,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31 no.  
    4 (2008): 667. 
15 OECD, “International Migration Remittances and  
    Their Role in Development,” International Migration  
    Outlook (2006): 240. 
16 Keely and Tran, “Remittances from Labor Migration,”  
    504. 
17 Barry, “Home and Away,” 7. 
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foreign currency can be used to finance the 
country’s deficits, debts, and import costs.18  
Finally, remittances can provide the resources for a 
transition to what would otherwise be unsustainable 
development.19  Again, remittances in themselves 
cannot solve development problems, but they do 
provide an economic boost and can serve as a 
bridge to sustainable development. 
Those emigrants who send remittances to their 
home countries do so for a variety of reasons, 
including pure altruism, pure self-interest, informal 
agreements between these individuals and their 
families, and portfolio management decisions.20  
First and most obvious is pure altruism, or a desire 
to either improve one’s family’s standard of living 
or to better one’s home country.  A second motive 
is pure self-interest.  One case of this is when 
emigrants want to inherit from their older family 
members in the home state and expect that sending 
remittances will ensure that by establishing 
goodwill.  A second example is when emigrants 
send remittances to ensure that the property or 
assets that they have left behind in the sending 
country are properly cared for, sometimes because 
they expect to return to their home country in the 
future.  Next, there are informal agreements 
between emigrants and their family members in 
their home countries.  In this case, emigrants remit 
as a form of insurance against financial problems in 
their host state, but also as a form of family loan.  
These informal agreements blend aspects of both 
the pure altruism and pure self-interest models.  
Finally, a fourth motive of emigrants in sending 
remittances to their home countries involves 
portfolio management decisions.  For example, 
saving in the home country may be more profitable 
for emigrants.  The motives behind an individual 
emigrant’s decision to remit will not fit neatly into 
one of these categories.  Rather, they will likely 
include several aspects of each. 
However, there are a number of disadvantages 
associated with the role that remittances play.  First, 
as mentioned earlier, some analysts argue that 
remittances distort the economies of sending 
countries.  They contend that remittances are rarely 
used to generate capital or create jobs.  Instead, 
they are primarily expended on consumer goods.  
These consumer goods have a high import content 
and thus reduce the country’s supply of foreign 
                                                             
18 Keely and Tran, “Remittances from Labor Migration,”  
    514. 
19 Ibid., 503. 
20 OECD, “International Migration Remittances,” 145. 
exchange.21  Critics of the positive impact of 
remittances also argue that they are a potentially 
instable source of revenue.  However, quantitative 
evidence does not support the notion that there is a 
steep and sudden decline in remittances after a 
reduction in migration.22  Rather, it has been found 
that remittances actually increase in the wake of 
such a reduction after a short interval of adaptation.  
There are a number of reasons for this.  First, a 
decrease in the outflow of emigrants does not 
decrease the current number of emigrants who are 
living abroad and sending remittances home.  Many 
of these individuals remain in their host countries 
when overall migration decreases.  Next, even 
when overall official estimates of migration 
decrease, emigrants continue to leave, both legally 
and illegally.  It has also been found that in many 
cases when entire families are reunited in host 
countries they continue to remit to their home 
country regardless.  Finally, when a reduction in 
migration results in emigrants returning home, they 
often bring a lump sum of earnings with them.  
Another argument disputing the importance of 
remittances is that they do not alter the fundamental 
weaknesses of economies.  Instead, they serve as a 
temporary fix that masks the true economic 
problems.  Further, remittances have failed to 
narrow the North-South economic gap, although 
they have narrowed income disparities within 
sending countries. 
There are also problems associated with 
remittance-sending infrastructure.  Emigrants often 
perceive official remittance channels as corrupt, 
inefficient, and unreliable.23  Admittedly, in many 
cases they are.  However, although using formal 
channels is more expensive than using informal 
channels in many cases, there are lower risks 
associated with their use.24  A further obstacle is the 
legal and institutional impediments that often stand 
in the way of emigrants utilizing formal channels, 
such as a lack of proper identity documents.25  This 
is particularly a problem for illegal immigrants.  
Sending states can take a number of steps to 
improve the quality of official remittance-sending 
infrastructure and thus encourage emigrants to 
utilize these formal channels.  First, states must 
expand access to these channels to compete with 
                                                             
21 Keely and Tran, “Remittances from Labor Migration,”  
    502. 
22 Ibid., 507. 
23 Barry, “Home and Away,” 10. 
24 OECD, “International Migration Remittances,” 151. 
25 Ibid., 152. 
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more readily available informal remittance systems.  
Next, sending states should make efforts to reduce 
the transaction costs associated with these channels 
by combatting corruption and inefficiencies as 
these problems are one of the main reasons that 
emigrants do not utilize them.  States should also 
refrain from interfering with private transfers by 
trying to force them through official channels or in 
to specific programs.26  Coercion will only further 
discourage emigrants from using this infrastructure.  
Finally, states can try to assist emigrants whose 
lack of proper identity documents prevents them 
from using official channels.  For example, 
Mexican consulates in the United States have 
begun to issue “matriculas” or identification cards 
for Mexican citizens living in the U.S.27  However, 
such measures are not a full solution as matriculas 
are accepted by some banks for the purpose of 
establishing a bank account and sending 
remittances, but not by others. 
 
Other Financial Contributions 
 
Although remittances are by far the largest 
source of financial inflow from emigrants for 
sending countries, there are other important forms 
of financial contributions.  Taxes are one other way 
in which sending states can extract resources from 
their diasporas.  However, imposing a tax on the 
diaspora is problematic in many regards.  First, 
states generally lack the enforcement power to 
coerce individuals who are not resident in their 
territory to pay taxes.28  Additionally, many sending 
states do not have sufficient resources to pursue 
these taxes.  One surprising example of the success 
of a tax on the diaspora is the case of Eritrea.  The 
vast majority of the Eritrean diaspora paid a 
voluntary 2% income tax that was instituted after 
Eritrea gained its independence.  This may be a 
function of Eritrea’s extension of dual citizenship 
to the diaspora and the role it accorded the diaspora 
in crafting the state’s constitution at independence. 
Sending states can also provide incentives for 
emigrants to invest in their home countries.  India is 
at the forefront of this strategy, giving select 
                                                             
26 Alan Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement Policies: What 
    are They, and What Kinds of States Use Them?,”  
    Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society, Working  
    Paper no. 32 (2006): 15. 
27 Susan Sachs, “New York, Citing Security, Rejects  
    Mexican ID Cards,” New York Times, December 28,  
    2002.  
28 Barry, “Home and Away,” 10. 
members of its diaspora preferential treatment 
under investment and banking laws.29  Foreign 
investment is an important source of foreign 
exchange and revenue for spurring economic 
growth in sending states.  In addition, many 
sending states prefer to obtain funds from their 
diasporas rather than other foreign investors or 
international capital markets.  The diaspora is often 
trusted more than other potential contributors by 
the sending state.  A final important form of 
financial contributions is emigrants’ direct 
contributions for specific initiatives.  Many local 
governments in sending states actively reach out to 
emigrants to obtain funding for local development 
projects.30 
 
Knowledge and Skill Contributions 
 
Financial contributions are not the only way in 
which emigrants can assist their home countries.  
Contributions of human capital, such as skills and 
knowledge, are also important.  The potential 
human capital contributions from diasporas are 
significant, especially in Africa.31  Such 
contributions are particularly salient in civil service 
reconstruction.  The knowledge and skills of the 
diaspora can help to rebuild the state’s institutions, 
increase civil service capacity, and thus contribute 
to stability and peace.  Diasporas are especially 
important in reconstruction because donors, 
whether individuals or other states, have short 
attention spans and will likely not commit to 
provide assistance for an extended period of time. 
The motives of the diaspora in contributing 
human capital to their home countries are varied.  
One would assume that the less time an emigrant 
has spent away from his home country, the more 
likely he would be to assist in such efforts.  
However, it has been found that there is not 
necessarily a linear relationship between the time 
an emigrant spends away from his home country 
and his interest in it.32  Crises in the homeland are 
one important factor in sparking emigrants’ interest 
in and human capital contributions to their home 
                                                             
29 Ibid., 11. 
30 Itzigsohn and Villacres, “Migrant Political  
    Transnationalism,” 676. 
31 Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, “Exploring the Role of  
    Diasporas in Rebuilding Governance in Post-Conflict  
    Societies,” in Africa’s Finances: The Contribution of  
    Remittances, New Castle upon Tyne, (UK: Cambridge  
    Scholars Publishing, 2008), 242. 
32 Ibid., 243. 
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country.  Emigrants’ desire to express their identity 
is also a causal factor in this case, as was seen with 
other types of contributions.  Finally, in a more 
pragmatic sense, emigrants often become involved 
in human capital transfers to maintain or acquire 
resources.33 
Knowledge transfers are especially pertinent in 
rebuilding governance in post-conflict societies.  
There are three dimensions to post-conflict 
reconstruction: a rehabilitative dimension oriented 
to the past, a resolutive dimension oriented to the 
present, and a preventive dimension oriented to 
both the present and the future.34  Good post-
conflict governance needs to ensure effectiveness, 
legitimacy, and security.  External actors, including 
diasporas, can influence reconstruction and prevent 
the reemergence of conflict by contributing 
resources, aiding in socialization, and providing 
political incentives for stability. 
There are a number of specific programs that 
harness the human capital of emigrants to assist 
sending states.  The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) administers the Transfer of 
Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals 
(TOKTEN) program, which focuses on the role that 
emigrants’ human capital can play in economic 
development in sending states.35  Other related 
programs include the International Organization for 
Migration’s (IOM) Return of Qualified African 
Nationals (RQAN) and Migration for Development 
in Africa (MIDA) programs and the Afghanistan 
Expatriate Program (AEP) organized by the Afghan 
government and donors.  These programs are 
designed to combat the brain drain in developing 
countries and gather the knowledge and skills 
necessary for development.  There are a number of 
forms of knowledge exchange that these programs 
can focus on, including permanent and temporary 
emigrant return.  However, a number of studies 
have found that permanent return programs are not 
very cost-effective and are thus less desirable to 
resource-strapped states.  In addition, recruitment 
for programs that involve emigrants’ return, 
whether temporary or permanent, is dependent on 
emigrants’ secure legal status in their host states.  
An emigrant is unlikely to take part in a program 
that could endanger his chance of remaining in his 
host country. 
There are a number of steps that sending states 
can take to increase emigrant participation in 
                                                             
33 Ibid., 243-4. 
34 Ibid., 245. 
35 Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement Policies,” 16. 
knowledge transfer program.  First, states must be 
clear about the program’s objectives, both to the 
emigrants and to themselves.  This is essential to 
effectively plan recruitment strategies and develop 
participant selection criteria.  Next, there should be 
clarity about the duration of the program and 
emphasis should be placed on the specific skills and 
credentials that will best contribute to the 
program’s success.  The incentives and 
compensation provided to emigrants should be 
targeted, have minimal visible perks, and be based 
on a market analysis.36  The problems associated 
with excessive compensation will be discussed 
later.  Next, the sending state and any international 
organization that it is working with should identify 
and utilize existing diaspora organizations and 
networks for recruitment and program support.  
Emigrants who participate in these groups are more 
likely to maintain interest in their home country and 
be willing to contribute human capital through 
knowledge transfer programs.  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, these programs should be 
conducted under the authority of the sending state’s 
government.  Attempts to bypass the state by other 
actors, perhaps with good intentions, only serve to 
weaken the state’s legitimacy and create 
governance problems in the future.  Any other 
actors, such as international organizations, that are 
involved should not try to co-opt the sending state’s 
authority. 
Yet, there are a number of potential problems 
associated with knowledge transfer programs.  As 
already mentioned, bypassing nascent or weak 
governments with NGOs, IGOs, and emigrants can 
undermine the governments’ authority, and it can 
also drain local capacity and entail greater costs.  
Employing emigrants, even under the auspices of 
the government, can also be problematic.  First, the 
repatriation of the diaspora can lead to the 
emergence of a new political elite and create or 
exacerbate political tensions.  This elite is likely to 
be out of touch with their home country to some 
extent due to the time they have spent away.  
Further, it is hard to recruit members of the 
diaspora with appropriate skills for these projects.  
Those with talent are generally among the first to 
leave the country, and have often been away for a 
significant period of time.  In addition, they are the 
most likely to successfully integrate into their 
receiving societies, and thus are less inclined to 
return even for short-term projects.  Those who are 
recruited must often be offered compensation at 
                                                             
36 Brinkerhoff, “Exploring the Role,” 257. 
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international wage levels and may be resented by 




Diasporas can also be influential in political 
advocacy on a number of issues.  The motives of 
the diaspora in advocacy are generally quite similar 
to those for maintaining ties with the sending state 
in general.  These motives include acquiring power 
and resources, assuaging guilt about leaving the 
sending state behind, maintaining a collective 
memory or myth of their home country, expressing 
an ethnic group consciousness, and keeping alive 
the expectation of return, among others.  An 
important addition to the motives in the case of 
advocacy is a desire to improve bilateral relations 
between the emigrants’ sending and receiving 
states.  The most prominent examples of diaspora 
advocacy are the Israeli and Irish diasporas.  The 
Israeli diaspora has been instrumental in lobbying 
their host governments to obtain support for Israel, 
and the Irish diaspora has been instrumental in 
fund-raising and mustering political support for a 
united, independent Ireland.38 
Effective diaspora advocacy hinges on a 
number of factors.  First, the diaspora must have 
adequate resources and the means to use them.39  In 
other words, they must have a supply of money and 
the organizations and mechanisms to use this 
money to achieve a desired political outcome.  The 
sending state’s support of a diaspora is crucial in 
establishing legitimacy for the group and assisting 
in the coordination of advocacy efforts.  The target 
country’s political system is also a factor.  
Democratic, liberal governments are far more open 
to emigrants’ lobbying efforts than other types of 
governments.  In recent years, democratization in 
many sending countries has opened a new avenue 
for diaspora political participation.  New 
technologies that facilitate transnational politics are 
also being seized upon by both non-state political 
entrepreneurs and state elites who are using the 
organizational form of “diaspora” and diaspora 
mobilization as a means of generating material 
resources and political support.40 
                                                             
37 Ibid., 248-9. 
38 Ostergaard-Nielsen, “International Migration and  
    Sending Countries,” 18. 
39 Newland, “Voice After Exit,” 2. 
40 Adamson and Demetriou, “Remapping the  
    Boundaries,” 491. 
Diasporas are concerned about a number of 
issues and pressure different actors to achieve their 
desired political outcomes.  First, diasporas care 
about their status in both their sending and host 
states.  They would lobby both states on these 
issues.  Their status is regulated in such matters as 
citizenship, migration status, voting rights, and 
their ability to participate in the socioeconomic 
lives of their sending towns or regions.  A second 
area of diaspora interest is issues that affect their 
sending countries.  This sector includes concerns 
such as human rights, good governance, and 
political participation in the homeland, both for 
themselves and for their fellow nationals.  Finally, 
there are issues with bilateral impact, including 
trade policy, humanitarian relief, development 
policy, diplomatic recognition, and economic 
sanctions.41  The political character of the sending 
country shapes the issues that the diaspora focuses 
on.  In countries where democracy is just emerging, 
emigrants usually focus on local politics and 
development.  On the other hand, in countries 
where there is a high degree of political 
institutionalization and partisanship, emigrants are 
more likely to demand that they be allowed to 
participate in the political process.42 
Diaspora advocacy takes on a number of 
forms.  Emigrants can function as lobbyists, putting 
direct pressure on a government to change its 
policies.  Other forms of direct political 
participation include electoral participation and 
public demonstrations.  Emigrants may also initiate 
lawsuits to elicit a change in government policy or 
conduct media campaigns to alter public opinion.  
Finally, emigrants can support political parties or 
causes through fund-raising.43  Diasporas’ 
interaction with political parties has taken on new 
forms in the age of transnational politics.  The 
inclusion of political organization organized abroad 
in the democratic political system of the sending 
states is new and quite remarkable.44  Most diaspora 
advocacy is directed toward either their sending or 
receiving countries.  However, actors such as 
NGOs, international organizations, media, business, 
labor unions and churches are also targets of 
diaspora action.45 
However, as with every other aspect of 
diaspora engagement discussed thus far, there are 
                                                             
41 Leblang, “Harnessing the Diaspora,” 8. 
42 Itzigsohn, “Boundaries of Citizenship,” 1146.  
43 Newland, “Voice After Exit,” 7. 
44 Itzigsohn, “Boundaries of Citizenship,” 1144. 
45 Newland, “Voice After Exit,” 7. 
6
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2011 [2012], Art. 21
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2011/iss1/21
 185
potential drawbacks and difficulties associated with 
diaspora advocacy.  First, there is the issue of 
political fragmentation within the diaspora and thus 
considerable difficulty in ascertaining who can 
legitimately speak for the diaspora.  Mexico has 
addressed this problem through the Consultative 
Council of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad, 
which consists of elected leaders from diaspora 
communities.46  With this institution, Mexico has 
been able to conduct relations with members of the 
diaspora who are at least somewhat representative 
of the diaspora’s views.  A second issue is when a 
diaspora’s advocacy is undermining, not 
supporting, a sending state’s position.  One notable 
example of this is the case of Turkey and its 
Kurdish diaspora.  The Kurdish diaspora has been 
largely antagonistic towards Turkey and has 
challenged the official conception of Turkish 
nationalism.  In host countries across Europe, the 
Kurdish diaspora has been able to interact and build 
networks that bypass, challenge, and contest 
identity construction in Turkey.47  Situations such 
as this pose serious problems for sending countries, 
as they do not have the authority or capacity to 
silence dissent abroad. 
 
Dual Citizenship/Nationality and Voting Rights 
 
One of the ways in which sending states can 
engage their diaspora populations is by extending 
voting rights or dual citizenship to these 
individuals.  In this section, the extension of dual 
citizenship to the diaspora and allowances for 
external voting will be treated together.  However, 
one should note the difference between the two.  
External voting simply refers to allowing citizens to 
cast votes outside the sending state.  If a sending 
state does not allow dual citizenship, emigrants 
who have acquired the citizenship of their host 
country will not be able to participate.  In addition, 
a sending state that allows dual citizenship may not 
have provisions for external voting.  In this case, an 
emigrant who wants to vote in his sending 
country’s elections must return home.   
Although many states perceive the 
phenomenon of external voting as anomalous and 
politically unpalatable, it has in fact become quite 
common in recent years.  Various sources provide 
slightly different data on external participation in 
elections, but all point to a growing voice for 
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emigrants in home country politics.  Of the 144 
countries on which data is available, 80% allowed 
emigrant participation in elections in some form.48  
According to David Leblang, 91 of 186 countries 
allow expatriates to vote, and 84 countries permit 
dual citizenship.49  The most prevalent form of 
external voting is voting abroad for one’s home 
district.  This method compromises 61.8% of the 
sample of external voting in Collyer and Vathi’s 
study.50  It has also been found that democracies are 
more likely to extend these benefits to their 
diasporas than non-democracies.  However, some 
non-democracies have also accorded their diasporas 
external voting rights.  For example, emigrants 
were able to participate in the 2007 Moroccan 
elections.51 
However, the concept of dual citizenship is 
convoluted.  There are two common, and quite 
dissimilar, interpretations of this term.52  The first 
conception of dual citizenship is one that conforms 
to the everyday understanding of the term.  In this 
conception, when a state extends dual citizenship to 
members of the diaspora this includes the full rights 
accorded to citizens resident in the state, including 
voting.  However, there is another interpretation of 
the term.  The extension of dual citizenship can also 
serve as a more symbolic gesture.  When states 
adhere to this interpretation, emigrants are 
recognized as members of the national community, 
but they are not granted all of the rights and 
benefits of traditional citizenship, such as voting 
and holding office.53  This restricted dual 
citizenship is sometimes termed dual nationality, 
though this is far from universal practice.  One 
must be careful in distinguishing between those 
states who allow full political participation for non-
resident citizens and those who do not as the term 
dual citizenship is used with a consistent meaning 
in neither academic nor policy publications. 
Diasporas are interested in and feel entitled to 
dual citizenship for a number of reasons.  On an 
emotional or psychological level, emigrants desire 
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to conceive of themselves as parts of the state 
whose territory they have left behind.  They want to 
be recognized and legitimated by their sending 
states’ governments as being a part of their 
respective communities.  Second, many emigrants 
believe that they still have a stake in their home 
countries.  Improved communication and 
transportation technologies allow emigrants to 
remain in contact with family members in the 
sending state, to send remittances, to visit, to retain 
property and invest in the sending state, and to 
harbor hopes of returning one day.  These linkages 
make emigrants feel that they are a still an integral 
part of their home countries.54  Finally, voting and 
other non-resident citizenship rights provide a way 
for emigrants to maintain and develop legitimate, 
state-sanctioned forms of political 
transnationalism.55  Although they may not utilize 
them in every case, emigrants desire access to 
formal transnational channels.  Again, this is a 
function of their desire for recognition, the need to 
be treated as legitimate actors. 
The main interest for sending states in 
extending dual citizenship is the expectation that 
they will be able to expect more from their 
diasporas in return.  Sending states hope that the 
extension of dual citizenship will cement 
emigrants’ identification with their home countries 
and thus elicit increased contributions.  They hope 
that according rights to emigrants will instill them 
with a sense of obligation.  In addition, extending 
political rights may foster a sense of trust between 
the sending state and the diaspora.  This is crucial 
in establishing and maintaining productive working 
relationships.  These relationships can channel 
increased contributions, whether they be financial 
or of a different nature, to the sending state.  The 
extension of dual citizenship may increase the 
financial inflow from emigrants, but can also make 
emigrants more likely to return home, a 
contribution of human capital.56  Another rationale 
behind extending voting rights to the diaspora is 
specifically related to post-conflict societies.  In 
countries where conflict has intentionally resulted 
in the expulsion of a particular ethnic or other 
social group, it is crucial that external voting be 
allowed.  When this is not the case, the state 
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legitimates ethnic cleansing.57  If external voters are 
excluded, the electorate and thus the resulting 
elected government will be heavily biased towards 
the social group that conducted the ethnic 
cleansing.  States must reject the idea that a 
segment of their population can be removed from 
political participation by the use of force and their 
expulsion from the state.    
There is quantitative evidence that there is a 
positive and significant correlation between the 
extension of dual citizenship to emigrants and 
financial inflows into the sending state.  Leblang’s 
study estimates that India, which does not currently 
permit dual citizenship or external voting (except in 
very limited circumstances), would likely increase 
the remittances that it receives from its diaspora by 
between 2% and 2.5% if it extends dual 
citizenship.58  Other forms of financial inflows are 
affected as well.  For example, both the migrant 
stock (the number of emigrants from a particular 
sending state that a host state has) and dual 
citizenship have positive and statistically 
significant effects on the allocation of foreign 
economic assistance to the sending state.  This also 
holds true with respect to the cross-border flow of 
portfolio investment.59  It seems that many states 
recognize the financial benefits of extending dual 
citizenship to their diasporas, as when a state’s 
national debt increases by 1%, the likelihood that it 
will extend dual citizenship to its diaspora increases 
by .15%.60  Although the strength of this 
relationship is far from overwhelming, it 
demonstrates sending states’ recognition of the role 
their diasporas’ contributions can play in ensuring 
their financial well-being.  However, in the case of 
the relationship between the extension of dual 
citizenship and emigrants’ intention to return to 
their home states, only a marginal effect has been 
documented.61 
There are a number of ways in which the 
voting process for the diaspora can be conducted.  
The easiest and least costly method as far as the 
sending state is concerned is to only allow 
emigrants to vote if they return in person to their 
home district.  However, this imposes a heavy 
burden on emigrants who desire to vote.  The 
second mode of participation is voting abroad for 
                                                             
57 Collyer and Vathi, “Patterns of Extra-territorial   
    Voting,” 8. 
58 Leblang, “Harnessing the Diaspora,” 19. 
59 Ibid., 13-15. 
60 Ibid., 27. 
61 Ibid., 22. 
8
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2011 [2012], Art. 21
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2011/iss1/21
 187
one’s home district.  In this method, emigrants are 
able to vote in their host countries, whether at their 
countries’ embassies or polling stations established 
specifically for the occasion, and have their votes 
counted as if they were still resident in their home 
district in the sending country.  The final type of 
electoral participation is voting abroad for one’s 
own dedicated representatives.  Voting abroad for 
dedicated diaspora representatives has largely been 
a post-1995 development.  A final distinction is that 
in some cases the diaspora is only allowed to 
participate in certain types of elections, such as 
legislative or presidential. 
However, there are a number of concerns 
associated with the extension of dual citizenship or 
providing external voting to the diaspora.  First, 
there is the principle of one man-one vote or the 
idea, in this context, that an individual should not 
be able to voice their opinion in elections in 
multiple countries and thus have more influence 
than others.  When members of the diaspora are 
able to vote both in their host and home states, this 
principle is violated.  Sending states do not 
confront this issue when they don’t permit dual 
citizenship but allow external voting for their 
emigrants who have not acquired another 
citizenship.  A second point of contention is 
whether the diaspora should be able to participate 
in the elections of a polity whose laws they are no 
longer subject to.  The argument here is that 
individuals do not have the right to decide how 
others will be ruled when they will not have to deal 
with the consequences of their electoral decisions 
as well.  A related issue is whether diasporas are 
too far out of touch with their sending states’ 
politics to effectively and intelligently participate in 
elections.  The time they have spent away from 
their home countries may make them ignorant of 
current concerns and needs.   
Next, diaspora political participation can 
contribute to ethnic and religious tension in the 
sending state in some cases.  For example, although 
India has not extended voting rights to its diaspora, 
it has encountered problems with Hindutva, or 
Hindu nationalist, organizations that contribute 
money to Hindu rightist parties in India and try to 
influence Indian politics in other ways.  Hindutva 
ideology and organizations have become 
increasingly visible in many South Asian diaspora 
communities since the early 1990s.62  For example, 
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the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu 
Congress), a Hindu Indian diaspora organization, 
contributed to ethnic and religious violence in the 
2002 Gujarat riots.63  If voting rights were extended 
to the Indian diaspora, it is likely that Hindutva 
political parties would receive an electoral boost.  
In general, individuals who are not subject to the 
consequences of their electoral choices are more 
likely to engage in spiteful, destructive ethnic 
politics.  The diaspora may have a romanticized 
conception of their homeland and may hold on to 
past grudges to maintain group solidarity.  
Alarmingly, Paul Collier has found that a country 
that has recently ended a conflict and has a large 
diaspora population is far more likely to fall into 
conflict again than a country that does not.64  
Finally, the extension of dual citizenship can 
provoke controversy in the host country.65  It can 
exacerbate worries in the host state about the 
diaspora’s loyalty.  However, this proves less 
controversial when voting rights are not included in 
the model of dual nationality rather than dual 
citizenship.  All of these concerns and others make 
dual citizenship far more controversial than other 
types of emigrant programs, such as cultural, social, 
or economic initiatives.66 
 
Diaspora Engagement Policy 
 
In the past 5 years, diasporas’ engagement 
with their sending countries has increased 
dramatically.  This is a result of emigrants being 
better organized in their host countries, the 
development of new communication and 
transportation technologies, and sending states’ 
recognition of the importance of engaging with 
their diasporas.67  States enacting diaspora 
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engagement policies come from all geo-political 
regions.68  They are also of various development 
levels and have both civic and identity-based 
models of citizenship.  Emigrant attitudes to their 
sending states are extremely varied and their levels 
of participation in transnational politics vary 
widely.69  Sending states’ policies toward their 
diasporas vary as well. 
For the most part, sending states continue to 
conceive of their diasporas as primarily economic 
resources based on their contributions through 
remittances, investment, the consumption of the 
sending states’ products, and their 
entrepreneurship.70  Although only a tiny 
percentage of this financial inflow is sent directly to 
the government, sending states realize that it is 
beneficial nonetheless.  States also try to promote 
the upward mobility of emigrants, perhaps out of 
pure altruism, but more likely to increase 
emigrants’ income and increase the likelihood that 
they will contribute to their home countries.  
Emigrants who were driven out by conflict often 
don’t have much to contribute to their home 
countries, but in some cases, such as with Bosnian 
and Eritrean refugees, these diasporas contribute a 
significant amount of money.71  Sending states also 
want to mobilize political support and control 
subversive political dissidence in the diaspora.72 
Many of the current relationships between 
emigrants and sending states are informal, ad hoc, 
and sporadic.73  They are based primarily on 
individual and group interactions and directed 
specifically at the family, village, or local level.  
Many countries lack an official diaspora policy.  
This lack of official policies on emigrants hampers 
intensive and sustained cooperation between 
sending states and their diasporas, especially with 
regard to issues of development.  Formal, 
institutionalized relationships at the national level 
between sending states and their diasporas would 
be beneficial in several ways.  Such cooperation 
would lend emigrants credibility, give them a 
political voice, and increase their contributions to 
their sending countries.74  Formal relationships 
would aid in the development of better diaspora and 
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development-related institutions as well.  
Additionally, sending states may be able to contain, 
manage and co-opt potentially dangerous groups, 
such as ethnic nationalist or separatist 
organizations, through engagement.  For example, 
many Indian emigrants have engaged in long-
distance nationalism, including fund-raising and 
charity for the homeland.  Much of this money has 
been collected by Hindu nationalist organizations, 
often without the donors’ knowledge.75  Instead of 
ignoring the problem or trying to marginalize these 
groups, the Indian government should try to engage 
them and redirect the money in more beneficial 
directions. 
Formal engagement can also be useful in 
linking diaspora organizations with other pertinent 
actors.  In general, emigrant organizations are more 
helpful in development work when partnered with 
sub-national development actors, such as NGOs, 
local governments in the sending country, or the 
private sector.76  In these situations, the interest and 
resources of emigrants can be shaped by the 
development experience of other actors who have 
more technical expertise in the area.  Without 
proper guidance, diaspora organizations may direct 
their energies and resources in inefficient ways. 
Alan Gamlen posits that there are three 
different types of relationships between sending 
states and their diasporas: relations of power, 
relationships of communication, and finalized 
activities.77  Relations of power concern the relative 
control that these actors can exercise upon each 
other.  For example, some states have the ability to 
exercise a great deal more influence on their 
diasporas than other states do.  When states hold 
the upper hand in their power relationships with 
their diasporas, they are better able to structure 
their interactions in ways that benefit the state.  In 
cases where diasporas exercise a considerable 
amount of power, perhaps more than their sending 
states, they are able to direct their relationship in 
ways that reflect their interests most effectively.  
However, the outcomes of both of these types of 
power relationships are dependent on states’ and 
diasporas’ perceptions of their interests.  If these 
actors perceive their interests similarly, there will 
be only be small disparities in outcomes based on 
the power distribution.  But, if their perceptions of 
their interests are widely divergent, power 
relationships are instrumental in determining 
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outcomes.  Relationships of communication are 
simply the channels that sending states and 
emigrants utilize to maintain contact with and 
knowledge of each other.  Finalized activities 
include the extension of rights to and the extraction 
of resources from the diaspora.  Although sending 
states may feel threatened by the extension of 
rights, this can prove to be a necessary component 
of transnational sovereignty in cases where the 
diaspora demands them. 
Similarly, there are also three different types 
of diaspora engagement policy: capacity building, 
extending rights to the diaspora, and extracting 
resources from the diaspora.78  Capacity building 
has two key components: fostering diaspora 
identification and solidarity with the homeland and 
crafting appropriate governmental structures to 
engage and effectively use the diaspora.  To 
encourage emigrants to identify as part of the 
imagined community of their home country, 
sending states can invoke symbols, espouse a 
rhetoric of national solidarity, or try to influence 
expatriate-focused media to carry their message.  
States can also support institutions such as culture 
and language clubs in emigrants’ host countries.  
The state’s aim in this aspect of capacity building is 
to create a more homogenous, and thus more easily 
manageable diaspora population.79 
The development of effective governmental 
apparatuses to deal with the diaspora requires a 
number of additional actions after the diaspora’s 
identification with the homeland has been 
solidified.  The first step generally involves the 
collection of basic information on the diaspora, 
such as data on emigrant populations or existing 
diaspora organizations in various host countries.  
With these data in hand, states can assess the 
methods they can use to manipulate their diasporas.  
One effective way for states to co-opt and manage 
their diasporas is creating a transnational migration 
organization under the authority of the state and 
treating it as a consultative organization.80  
Representation of the diaspora in this manner may 
allay some of the concerns of the diaspora in 
whether the state is considering its interests.  This 
approach holds promise for states that wish to forgo 
extending a more formal voice to their diasporas by 
granting them voting rights, which can entail a 
number of previously mentioned problems.  The 
process of extending rights to the diaspora was 
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discussed earlier, as was the extraction of 
resources.  Obtaining resources from the diaspora is 
a matter of persuading emigrants and convincing 
them that their interests include supporting their 
homelands. 
Some of the specific ways that sending states 
can engage their diasporas have been discussed 
earlier.  To begin a conversation with their 
emigrant populations, states can reach out to them 
through existing governmental structures such as 
embassies or consulates.  Diaspora organizations 
such as hometown associations also provide a 
forum for states to engage these populations.  
Besides engaging emigrants through specific 
institutions, sending states can take steps to 
encourage the diaspora to harbor favorable 
perceptions of their homeland.  For example, states 
can extend political rights, encourage financial 
contributions through rhetorical appeals and 
financial incentives, and assert emigrants’ rights 
abroad.  Advocacy by sending states for their 
diasporas may be especially helpful in convincing 
emigrants that their home states are supporting 




The successes and failures of sending 
countries in engaging their diasporas are instructive 
in which policies are most likely to be effective and 
useful for similar states.  Mexico is a classic 
example of an emigration or sending state.  Over 
the years, it has had a consistent and significant net 
outflow of people.81  The majority of Mexican 
emigrants reside in the United States.  In 2000, 
Mexico’s National Population Council estimated 
that approximately 8,173,689 Mexican-born 
individuals resided in the United States.  Such a 
large emigrant population centered in one host 
country provides a concentrated and significant 
financial flow for Mexico.  In 2001, the Bank of 
Mexico reported that Mexican emigrants in the 
United States remitted a total of US$8.895B.  In the 
same year, the Inter-American Development Bank 
estimated this flow of remittances at US$9.23B.82  
Remittances constitute the third largest source of 
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foreign capital for Mexico, falling behind only oil 
exports and foreign investment. 
Mexico’s relationship with its diaspora has not 
always been positive or supportive.  In fact, there is 
a past tradition of neglect of and disdain for 
emigrants among Mexican government officials as 
well as intellectuals.83  Mexican emigrants were 
often treated as traitors to their homeland and their 
identity, having abandoned both to pursue a new 
life abroad.  However, this dynamic began to 
change during the 1980s.  In this decade, Mexican 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari courted 
Mexican-American leaders and their organizations 
in search of political backing and financial 
contributions.  From this point onward, Mexican 
emigrants and their organizations began to exert 
influence on both the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD) and the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI).  In addition, the 
revolutionary left-wing Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation (EZLN) began to vie for emigrants’ 
loyalty in 1994.84 
The increased influence of the diaspora on 
Mexican domestic politics emboldened emigrants 
to demand more representation and rights from the 
Mexican government.  During the 1990s the 
Mexican government granted emigrants significant 
new political rights.  In 1996 Mexico launched 
external voting for its citizens who resided abroad.  
Additionally, Mexico amended its constitution to 
permit the non-loss of Mexican nationality in the 
case of a Mexican acquiring a different 
citizenship.85  These are two distinct developments 
and neither one is quite as beneficial for Mexican 
emigrants as one would first think.   
First, the adoption of external voting did 
indeed allow for Mexicans abroad to cast their 
votes in the 2006 presidential elections by post.86  
Previously, Mexican citizens would have to return 
to their home district in Mexico to cast their ballots.  
The number of citizens who returned home to vote 
in the past was small but meaningful.87  However, 
emigrants needed a special identification card to 
vote abroad.  This card was issued only in Mexico, 
so emigrants would in fact have to return in order to 
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vote if they did not already possess this 
identification card.88  It is estimated that 4.2 of the 
11 million Mexicans abroad possessed one of these 
ID cards in 2006, but only 40,665 of these 
individuals registered to vote.89  Second, the reform 
that allowed for dual nationality did not permit dual 
citizenship in the more permissive sense and its 
attendant voting rights.  Rather, those Mexicans 
abroad who had acquired a different citizenship 
were allowed to regain Mexican nationality and a 
few accompanying rights, including certain benefits 
associated with land ownership and inheritance 
rights in Mexico.  This was primarily a symbolic 
move that recognized these individuals as members 
of the Mexican national community. 
These reforms were significant however and 
signaled a meaningful shift in the Mexican 
government’s treatment of the diaspora.  Mexican 
President Vicente Fox in particular recast the image 
of Mexican emigrants as a welcome and integral 
part of the Mexican community.90  This recognition 
was a function of both emigrants’ demands for 
rights and recognition as well as the government’s 
acceptance of Mexico’s increasing dependence on 
the diaspora’s remittances, investments, and 
transfers of knowledge, skills, and technology.  It 
will take several years to determine if the actions 
that Mexico has taken in recent years to draw its 





Nigeria is also a country that has a history of 
shunning its diaspora.  The country has failed to see 
its emigrants as potential contributors to Nigeria 
and its development.  Rather, it has characterized 
the diaspora, as well as internal migrants, as a sign 
of development failure, not a source of positive 
political and social change.  Generally, the only 
connection between migration and development in 
Nigeria that has been acknowledged by the 
Nigerian government is the knowledge and skills 
that emigrants returning to Nigeria bring back with 
them.91  This negative perception of emigrants is 
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largely a function of Nigeria’s oil supply and its 
consequences.  Emigration of the Nigerian elite has 
long been associated with the outflow of capital 
from Nigeria and the transfer of oil profits to 
overseas accounts.92  As a consequence, emigrants 
have been viewed as individuals removing wealth 
from the country rather than contributing to it.  
Beyond being economic leeches, emigrants have 
also been characterized as social deviants and 
traitors. 
However, the emigration of individuals from 
lower socioeconomics classes of Nigerian society 
has in fact been financially beneficial for the state.  
Even human trafficking, a serious problem in 
Nigeria, has appreciably increased remittances.93  
Unfortunately, Nigeria has not yet pursued a 
migration or remittance-focused development 
strategy, most likely because it does not hold 
emigrants in high regard.  Emigrants’ contributions 
are no longer a resource that Nigeria can ignore, as 
countries with far fewer emigrants have begun to 
examine and implement policies to harness their 
diasporas’ power.  Nigeria must shift its current 
focus on migration prevention to a more realistic 
and useful orientation. 
The framework for a transition to a more 
effective diaspora engagement strategy may have 
been laid in the late 1990s.  Nigeria’s 1999 
transition to democracy may bode well for future 
policy related to emigrants.  As mentioned earlier, 
democracies are more likely than non-democracies 
to extend political rights to their diasporas.  From 
this fact, one can generalize that democracies are 
more likely to recognize and support their 
diasporas.  This seems to be the way Nigerian 
emigrants felt at the inception of democracy, as 
they have been more willing to return to the 
country as well as contribute financially. 
Since its transition to democracy, the Nigerian 
government has taken a number of steps to engage 
the diaspora.  For example, a “Presidential dialogue 
with Nigerians abroad” was launched in 2002, and 
the government has established the Nigerian in the 
Diaspora Organization (NIDO) in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.94  This organization’s official 
mission is four-fold.  First, it aims to increase the 
participation of the diaspora in Nigerian affairs.  
Second, it serves as a communication forum 
between the state and the diaspora.  Third, it is 
intended to improve Nigeria’s international image.  
                                                             
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., 17. 
Finally, the organization is focused on building a 
network of Nigerians with professional skills and 
knowledge and making this data available to the 
Nigerian government, the private sector, and other 
actors who partner with Nigeria on development 
issues. 
However, Nigeria’s perception of migration as 
only being beneficial when emigrants return is still 
evident.  The recently created Nigeria National 
Volunteer Service (NNVS) was crafted to reverse 
the effects of the brain drain.95  This reflects the 
emphasis placed on the value of return migration.  
This program has only been able to achieve the 
temporary return of skilled emigrants in most cases.  
Nigeria has also been largely dismissive of 
remittances because it has focused instead on larger 
transfers of funds, generally linked to the oil 
industry.  Oil revenues have made remittances less 
significant as a percentage of Nigeria’s GDP. 
To harness the power of its diaspora, Nigeria 
must revamp its anti-emigrant image and sustain 
efforts to communicate and create relationships 
with the diaspora.  The government must address 
the exploitation of Nigerians abroad, which has 
become a considerable problem, especially with 
respect to human trafficking.96  Advocacy for the 
human rights of emigrants will increase trust 
between the government and the diaspora.  Beyond 
abandoning its anti-emigration stance, the Nigerian 
government should embrace more liberal migration 
policies.  Many of its current policies are focused 
on restricting the free movement of individuals.  
Liberalizing migration policies may promote 
development, as individuals who are freely able to 
travel back and forth to a country are more likely to 
view the country favorably and contribute to it.97  
There are a number of other unfavorable structural 
conditions that need to be remedied.  High crime 
rates, governmental corruption, an unfavorable 
investment environment, and general insecurity 
have discouraged emigrants from investing in or 
returning to Nigeria.98 
  
The Dominican Republic 
 
The case of the Dominican Republic and its 
dealings with its diaspora reflect the dynamics of 
diaspora lobbying of the homeland, the 
institutionalization of democracy and competitive 
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party politics, and the extension of political rights 
to the diaspora.  Dominican emigrants have been 
pressuring their home government for recognition 
and political rights since the 1970s.  However, until 
the mid-1990s the Dominican government largely 
ignored its diaspora beyond accepting the money 
that these individuals remitted.  In 1994, the 
Dominican Constitution was amended to permit 
Dominican citizens resident abroad to acquire 
another citizenship without losing their Dominican 
one.99  This was a step further than the Mexican 
government went in its non-loss of Mexican 
nationality reform.   
The diaspora became even more entwined in 
Dominican politics in 1996, the year in which 
competitive multi-party elections were 
institutionalized in the DR.  In 1996, Leonel 
Fernandez, who spent most of his childhood in 
New York as a legal permanent resident, was 
elected President, reflecting the growing influence 
of Dominican emigrants.100  In 1997, the right to 
vote abroad was extended, but was not 
implemented until the 2004 presidential elections.  
Citizens resident abroad may vote in presidential 
elections and are only permitted to cast ballots in 
person from a select group of cities in five 
countries: the United States, Canada, Spain, Puerto 
Rico and Venezuela.101  The diaspora electorate is 
particularly significant in the case of the Dominican 
Republic, as the emigrant population eligible to 
vote represents approximately 25% of the 5 million 
voters registered in the country.102  In 2004, of the 
52,431 Dominican citizens registered abroad, 
35,042 cast ballots in the presidential election, 
showing an impressive turn-out rate of over 66%.103  
Although the turn-out for registered voters abroad 
was quite high, the vote abroad reflected only about 
1% of the overall vote in this election.  A 
conservative estimate would predict this number to 
be perhaps 10 times greater.104  Perhaps Dominican 
emigrants simply wanted to be recognized by their 
home government and did not have a strong desire 
to actually participate in the DR’s elections.  
Another possible explanation is the requirement 
that Dominican voters abroad possess an 
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identification document that is only available in the 
DR, similar to Mexico’s requirement, discouraged 
many potential voters.  Emigrants who were not 
fully committed to participating in the Dominican 
electoral process or ones whose economic means 
made a return trip burdensome were unlikely to 




El Salvador demonstrates one of the other 
important aspects of diasporas’ relationships with 
their sending countries: hometown associations and 
their contributions to development.  The 
institutionalization of formal democracy in El 
Salvador was marked by the 1992 peace agreement 
between El Salvador’s government and the rebel 
FMLN.  The emergence of democracy sparked 
greater involvement and contributions from 
Salvadorian emigrants.  The main form that this 
increased interaction took was in the form of 
hometown associations (HTAs).  HTAs are groups 
in a host country that unite emigrants from the 
same village, town, or general region of a sending 
country.  They often contribute to development 
projects and other initiatives in their home region. 
One particularly instructive example of a 
Salvadorian HTA’s involvement with its respective 
hometown that illustrates some of the problematic 
aspects of HTAs involves the town of Intipucá and 
the Fundación Unidos por Intipucá.  Some 
observers think that the relationship between these 
two actors is a model of how diaspora groups can 
positively contribute to development.  Others think 
that the Fundación’s work in Intipucá exemplifies 
dependence, a lack of productivity, and the 
exacerbation of social ills.105  A great deal of 
money from the Fundación has flowed into 
Intipucá.  However, these resources have been 
almost entirely spent on projects that benefit the 
lower socioeconomic classes in El Salvador very 
little if any at all.  The allocation of funds was 
decided by the Fundación’s members at its 
headquarters in Washington, D.C.  Members of the 
Fundación are relatively well-off, and their interests 
in Intipucá generally lay in the city center.  
Accordingly, virtually all of the Fundación’s 
donations and projects have focused on the urban 
center.  This has resulted in a rather glamorous, 
modern city center surrounded by dismal slums 
populated by desperately poor Salvadorians.  In 
many ways, HTAs like the Fundación constitute a 
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new elite, one that reinforces the existing social 
structure and contributes money in ways that serve 
its own interests.  In the past, there have not been 
any legal or institutional measures in El Salvador to 
ensure equality or the representation of different 
interests in the construction of development 
projects funded by the diaspora.106 
Perhaps recognizing the problems associated 
with “development” projects that only function to 
serve elite interests, the government of El Salvador 
has taken steps in recent years to encourage 
diaspora groups to contribute in a more beneficial, 
balanced manner.  Since 2003, the government has 
tried to harness Salvadorian HTAs’ interest, 
engagement, and contributions through the Unidos 
por la Solidaridad (United for Solidarity) program.  
Unidos por la Solidaridad is a transnational 
development program intended to coordinate the 
actions and resources of HTAs, local communities, 
and municipal and national governments on 
economic and social development projects in El 
Salvador.107  The key component of the program is 
a contest in which municipal governments, in 
conjunction with HTAs, compete for government 
funds.  The contest requires that each competitor 
develop an investment plan as well as outline a 5-
year development agenda.   
These measures may be beneficial in 
encouraging diaspora organizations to truly 
consider the impact of their intervention in their 
homelands.  If the actions of organizations such as 
the Fundación exacerbated socioeconomic divisions 
simply through miscalculations or short-
sightedness, then plans such as the Salvadorian 
government’s hold a great deal of promise.  
However, if a diaspora organization is actively and 
knowingly reinforcing elite interests, such measures 
are likely to be unsuccessful.  In this case, the 
sending country’s government must decide whether 
this financial inflow is of greater significance than 
the problems that it creates.  If the contributions are 
deemed to be more harmful than beneficial, the 
sending government should try to exclude the 
money.  However, this poses a number of 
problems.  The government must distinguish 
between harmful and beneficial resource inflows, 
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Haiti 
 
The case of the Haitian diaspora illustrates a 
number of dynamics involved in engaging the 
diaspora, including the role that emigrants can play 
in undermining the sending state’s government and 
functioning as a force for political support.  When 
Haiti was under the leadership of President 
Duvalier, the government largely tried to sever the 
relationship between Haiti and Haitians abroad.108  
Many members of the diaspora saw themselves as a 
political alternative to his regime.  Although they 
could have no direct effect on the Haitian political 
process because they could not vote, the diaspora 
did not support the Haitian government, voiced its 
discontent, and sought the ouster of Duvalier. 
When Duvalier fell from power, it was 
generally a result of forces other than the Haitian 
diaspora’s influence or activities.  However, the 
transition did bode well for the diaspora.  The 
Haitian government began to reverse the anti-
emigrant policies of the Duvalier regime and 
reintegrate the diaspora into the national 
community.  The establishment of the “10th 
department,” or a 10th administrative district 
focused on the diaspora was intended to open a 
channel of communication and engagement 
between the government and Haitians abroad.109  
Although the government reached out to the 
diaspora to some extent, it did not extend political 
rights such as external voting or dual citizenship.  
Perhaps when democracy and multi-party, 
competitive elections are fully institutionalized in 
Haiti the diaspora will be accorded some political 
rights.  The potential political contributions of the 
Haitian diaspora are evident.  When President 
Aristide was in exile, emigrants provided him with 
both political and economic support.110  The 
diaspora can only become more influential as other 




India is an interesting example of a sending 
country that, despite having a large and influential 
diaspora, has tried to exclude its emigrants from its 
political, social, and economic life.  When India 
gained its independence in 1947, the Indian 
government’s, and many individual Indians’, stance 
was generally that those who had left the country 
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had forfeit their rights as Indians and should try to 
integrate into their host countries as much as 
possible.111  In addition, India’s closed and 
staunchly independent model of development 
during its early years actively discouraged outside 
influence and involvement, including the potential 
contributions of the diaspora.112  India was to be 
governed and recreated by true Indians alone, not 
those who had abandoned the country and not by 
other foreign actors. 
During the 1960s and the 1970s, India 
experienced a large labor exodus, as many 
individuals relocated to find work in Middle 
Eastern and Gulf countries.113  However, this 
emigration was mostly temporary, as the host 
countries desired short-term labor assistance, not 
permanent immigration.  The brain drain, in which 
Indian professionals and intellectuals have left the 
country, has been a separate phenomenon.  Both 
flows could have been manipulated by the Indian 
government in favorable ways, drawing resources 
into the country for development, but the negative 
perception of emigrants proved to be a formidable 
barrier.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, India 
failed to open itself to migrant investment in any 
significant way, retaining its closed model of 
development. 
At the end of 1990, India’s supply of foreign 
capital was almost entirely depleted.114  This was a 
huge crisis for the government, and it began to 
reconsider its stance on foreign contributions.  In a 
desperate move, India developed special 
concessions for emigrants who invested in the 
country, but the non-repatriation of capital was still 
the standard for these investments.  By relying on 
its diaspora, India was able to avoid dependence on 
the IMF and its conditional loans.  Although India 
granted some benefits to emigrants in this case, its 
actions to address the economic crisis still represent 
a missed opportunity to effectively engage the 
diaspora.  Outside investors, including the diaspora, 
were viewed as a necessary evil and as economic 
predators.  Once the economy recovered beyond the 
brink of collapse, economic liberalization stalled.  
The contributions of Indian emigrants, who were 
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perceived to be corrupted by their host countries, 
were ignored once again. 
Since 1997, economic reforms have resumed, 
but FDI remains low.  This is disappointing, as the 
Indian diaspora is rather wealthy, successful, and 
interested in Indian affairs.  In recent years, the 
Indian government has developed a few initiatives 
that may signal a shift in attitudes toward the 
diaspora.  For example, Person of Indian Origin 
(PIO) cards have been introduced.115  These cards 
are the equivalent of a 20-year visa and accord 
certain privileges to their bearers, including special 
treatment in buying property and investing in the 
country.  External voting was allowed for the first 
time in 2004 by post or proxy, but only members of 
the armed services or civil servants deployed 
abroad were eligible.116  In addition, the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) announced in 2002 that it would 
begin the process to grant dual citizenship to 
Indians resident abroad.117  The BJP likely made 
this move because it is an unabashedly Hindu 
nationalist organization and recognizes the 
potential political benefits of doing so, as the Indian 
diaspora has generally been quite supportive of 
such organizations.  However, the constitutional 
changes necessary to institute dual citizenship have 
yet to be set in motion, and it is unlikely that they 




The relationship between Eritrea and its 
diaspora illustrates several important aspects of 
sending state-emigrant linkages, including the 
selflessness that emigrants can show in contributing 
to their homelands and the ways in which 
previously cozy relationships can sour.  Linkages 
between Eritrea and its diaspora predate the 
establishment of Eritrea as an independent state.  
During Eritrea’s struggle for independence, the 
diaspora was mobilized, especially by the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) to increase 
awareness of the conflict, provide political 
advocacy, and raise money for the war, relief 
operations, and welfare services.118  These 
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contributions were vital in sustaining the 
independence movement.   
Recognizing the importance of the diaspora, 
the Eritrean government opted for a broad 
definition of citizenship at independence that was 
not dependent on residence in Eritrea or an 
individual’s status in his host country.  In the 1993 
Referendum for Independence, 84,370 votes were 
cast by Eritrean emigrants.  For context, it is 
estimated that of a total 3 million Eritreans, 1 
million are resident outside the state.119  The 
diaspora was also intimately involved in the 
creation of the Eritrean constitution.  Although 
emigrants were able to vote in the referendum on 
independence, this seems to have been a one-shot 
deal, as they are no longer accorded external voting 
rights.120  As mentioned earlier, shortly after it 
gained its independence Eritrea instituted a 
voluntary 2% tax on the diaspora that the majority 
of emigrants complied with.121  Eritrea’s rapid 
social, economic, and political reform and 
concurrent economic development and 
democratization may bode well for emigrants in 
obtaining more political rights including external 
voting. 
Eritrea called on its diaspora again during its 
1998-2000 war with Ethiopia.  The state took three 
main steps to establish deeper connections with 
emigrants.122  First, it reopened previously shuttered 
political office in host states to ascertain the 
demographics of the diaspora.  Second, it 
revitalized the Eritrean Relief Association network.  
This organization operates under different names in 
different countries.  For example, in the United 
States it is the Eritrean Development Fund.  Third, 
it initiated an information campaign within the 
diaspora to spread awareness of Eritrea’s needs in 
the war and the importance of emigrants’ 
contributions. 
Financial contributions from the diaspora have 
been especially important for Eritrea because the 
state is suspicious of foreign aid.  During the war 
with Ethiopia, Eritrea added significant additional 
financial requests to the standing voluntary 2% tax.  
For example, in the United Kingdom Eritrea asked 
for an additional £1 per day as well as a £500 lump 
sum for 1999.  The government also began issuing 
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bonds in 1999 and auctioning homes in Asmara, the 
capital, to the diaspora.123 
In recent years, Eritrea has become less 
enthusiastic about its diaspora.  It has become 
concerned about emigrants’ critiques of the 
government as well as the growing autonomous 
linkages between the diaspora and individuals in 
Eritrea.  It has also been disappointed in the 
diaspora’s limited success with political 
advocacy.124  Eritrean emigrants have also 
developed negative perceptions of the state.  Many 
emigrants are experiencing a growing 
disillusionment and a feeling of exploitation.125  
The excessive financial demands of the government 
have strained the relationship between emigrants 
and the state.  There is overwhelming social 
pressure within diaspora communities to contribute 
generously to the state, with individuals often 
checking on each other to ensure that everyone is 
giving.  This pressure, combined with emigrants’ 
desire to contribute to their family members in 
Eritrea as well, has simply been too much for the 
diaspora to handle in many cases.              
States face a number of limitations in efforts to 
increase their engagement with their diasporas.  
First, the ever broader dispersal of emigrants can 
strain resource-strapped states’ abilities to 
effectively reach these populations.126  Second, the 
principle of territorial sovereignty restricts states’ 
power in dealing with their diasporas.127  Although 
they may communicate and develop relationships 
with their emigrants, they generally do not wield 
any coercive power over these individuals.  This 
can be especially problematic when the relationship 
between the sending state and its emigrants is 
antagonistic rather than synergistic.  Although there 
are a number of issues associated with engaging 
and extracting resources from diaspora populations, 
the importance of doing so will likely grow in the 
future as migration flows continue to increase.  
Sending states must assess the resources they can 
potentially extract from their diasporas and plan 
their engagement strategies accordingly.   
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